Parliamentary America Two Years Later

Max Stearns

Exactly two years ago today, my book Parliamentary America: The Least Radical Means of Radically Repairing Our Broken Democracy (JHU 2024) was officially published.

In the lead-up to the book’s release—and especially in the year that followed—I gave dozens of lectures, both in person and virtually, from as far west as Seattle and Los Angeles to as far east as Cape Cod. I also appeared on numerous podcasts, and even on The Weekly Show with Jon Stewart. I spoke to audiences that were red, blue, and purple, and young, old, and every age in between.

Two years marks a natural moment for reflection, both in terms of American politics and in terms of the challenges that motivated me to write the book.

When I wrote Parliamentary America, I believed we were already in a constitutional crisis—one whose outcome did not depend on who would win the 2024 presidential election. In fact, I have believed we were in a constitutional crisis since the beginning of what I will call the Trump era, corresponding to Donald Trump’s announcement as a candidate for the Republican nomination in 2015.

But the roots of our crisis run deeper.

They trace back to the beginning of the information age. Two technological developments fundamentally transformed our political ecosystem: the rise of social media, which displaced traditional print and broadcast media as the primary source of news and news-like information and the increasing sophistication of hyper-partisan gerrymandering. Together, these developments entrenched and exacerbated the most problematic features of two-party presidentialism.

Those who continue to celebrate the supposed brilliance of the Framers’ system—resting on separation of powers, federalism, and the idea that rival institutional jealousies would thwart the dynamics that had threatened other historical democracies—often mean well. But it is important to acknowledge that they are mistaken.

Our system never worked the way the Framers imagined.

One of the great challenges of our time is recognizing that the civic lessons many of us absorbed as children—lessons rooted in American exceptionalism—turn out to be wrong. The Framers did not solve the problem of democratic governance. The institutions they created never functioned as envisioned. From the very beginning, our constitutional practice bore only limited resemblance to their understanding.

To be sure, American democracy endured—and indeed it often flourished. Our formal constitutional system has outlasted most others. But as I explain in the book, those successes—and that endurance—occurred in spite of, not because of, the constitutional scheme the Framers put in place. Over time, political parties, informal norms, and evolving practices supplanted many of the institutional dynamics the Framers thought they had ensured. Those practices arose from the simple reality that rival jealousies were more often defined by political parties than by affiliation with constitutionally established institutions.

Much of the mythology surrounding the Framers’ design derives from a famous series of essays known as The Federalist Papers. Long before Alexander Hamilton’s life was set to music, generations of students—including those in elementary school, high school, and law school—were taught that three brilliant authors—James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay—articulated a system of never-ending rival institutional jealousies that would avoid what they termed the “violence of faction,” a precursor to what we now call political parties. In effect, these benign jealousies would ensure outcomes that were stable, high-minded, and wise.

It is a lovely story.

And it is fictional.

Two years after the publication of my book, the 2024 election has confirmed many of my concerns. Donald Trump now holds near-total political authority within the Republican Party. Earlier murmurs about refusing to tolerate his conduct toward women, minorities, immigrants, and political opponents ultimately gave way to a more powerful structural force: in a two-party presidential system, neither side can afford to lose any portion of its coalition for fear of handing power to the other.

Even now, at a moment when many of the administration’s policies are deeply unpopular—tariffs, military escalation abroad, aggressive immigration enforcement, attacks on civil service independence, and the erosion of administrative professionalism—political rhetoric remains cheap, especially in the periods between elections.

As the familiar saying goes, Republicans fall in line, whereas Democrats form a circular firing squad.

The Democratic Party has not fared much better under this stress test. Divisions between democratic socialists and more moderate Democrats continue to deepen, creating opportunities that political actors—Trump in particular—are adept at exploiting.

Meanwhile, internal conflicts over complex issues, including especially Israel, are hardening into loyalty tests. Any semblance of nuance is increasingly unwelcome. Even individuals who are sharply critical of Israeli policy often feel pressured to adopt extreme or historically dubious claims that go to the state’s very legitimacy.

In our two-team system, subtlety disappears as the stakes rise. Each side moves further apart, increasingly hollowing out the political center. Moderation has not become irrational; rather, the growing perception is that political survival demands ideological conformity.

I will not rehearse here the full argument of Parliamentary America. But two years later, several observations seem clear.

First, the diagnosis offered in the book remains compelling—perhaps even more so than when it was first published. The book explains the structural problems inherent in two-party presidentialism and the political dynamics that have produced our present crisis.

Second, it explains why many commonly proposed reforms—however well intentioned—are unlikely to succeed.

Third—and most importantly—the book does not stop at diagnosis. It offers concrete institutional reforms, explaining with precision how vital elements of parliamentary governance can be adapted to the American constitutional system.

Crucially, the reforms my book proposes are grounded in genuine political constraints. Unlike many superficially appealing proposals, mine allow all sitting members of Congress—both House and Senate—to retain their existing positions even after reform is implemented. Despite the challenges inherent in amending the Constitution, this feature makes adopting the book's proposals more politically feasible than many others that avoid amending.

Most importantly, my proposals would give American voters something they currently lack: the ability to express their sincere political preferences without fear that doing so will simply hand power to the party they most oppose.

Not long ago, I gave a lecture titled Parliamentary America: Now More Than Ever. Two years after publication, that title feels even more apt.

The problems diagnosed in the book have not receded. They have intensified.

And that is why the lessons of Parliamentary America remain as vital today as when the book first appeared.